Looking Forward to Zapad 2017
Every four years, Russia conducts joint war games with Belarus by carrying out a large-scale strategic exercise known as Zapad (meaning West). In 2008, Russia used the premise of a massive military exercise to help mask military action against Georgia, and Zapad 2013 was used to secretly forward deploy units for the eventual invasion of the Crimean Peninsula. These actions are just recent highlights of Russia’s long tradition of using military exercises to deceive the world.
Russia’s 2017 iteration of its Zapad military exercise is scheduled for September, and it will once again feature a wide range of innovative technologies and concepts, but it will not be the latest employment of maskirovka (military deception) as many Russia watchers in Eastern Europe have warned. Rather than fret over an unlikely invasion in the Baltics, the West must focus instead on discerning the implications of the innovation Russia will bring to Zapad 2017, an exercise that has proven to be important for signaling mechanisms the Russian military plans to use in the near future.
Zapad 2017 may end up being the largest military exercise since the end of the Cold War, but this is not and will not be a repeat of 2008 or 2013. The international forces now stationed in the Baltics and Eastern Europe are a useful deterrent against anything less than a full Russian onslaught, which would surely be detected. The world is now alert to both Russia’s growing hybrid and conventional military capabilities, making such an audacious move like invading the Baltics that much more difficult to accomplish. Many assume that the Russian forces participating in Zapad 2017 will remain in Belarus to apply pressure on NATO, but this concern is greatly exaggerated. The president of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, has repeatedly pushed back against greatly expanding Russian military infrastructure, such as new air bases, in his country. Allowing more than the few thousand air defense troops already in the country to stay for an extended amount of time is highly improbable and would be tantamount to invasion if done without his approval.
Unmanned vehicles, like in 2013, should be a key point of interest in Zapad 2017 for Western observers. However, the focus should not be entirely on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), but also on unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs). Russia’s development of UGVs has rapidly matured since 2013. Russia is already using UGVs in Syria against Western-backed rebels. Ukraine will soon utilize UGVs in the Donbass conflict, a development Russia would be keen to develop itself for countermeasures. How Russia deploys and utilizes UGVs in Zapad 2017 will surely be a harbinger of UGV use by and against more advanced militaries.
Looking at UAVs, the possibility of the Belarusian-made Burevestnik MB, an ISR-Strike UAV that can even carry mini-suicide drones, making an appearance is possible. Russia is believed to be the primary client of interest for the system. The Burevestnik MB was showcased at the MAKS 2017 military exhibition show in Russia and is expected to complete trials in the fall, possibly in time for Zapad 2017. Russia’s UAV fleet, while large in numbers, primarily comprises small UAVs for artillery spotting (such as in Zapad 2013). The introduction of an ISR-Strike UAV platform would be a noticeable step change for Russia’s capabilities, especially one that comes with suicide drones. Russia has been using the conflict in Eastern Ukraine as a testing ground for new equipment and concepts both directly and indirectly through its separatist proxies, possibly including suicide drone use. The Russian-linked separatists in Eastern Ukraine used a rudimentary suicide drone concept when they attached a thermite grenade to a small drone and used it to blow up $1 billion in ammunition for the Ukrainian military. If the idea did not originate from Russian planners, it is almost certainly now a concept they plan to develop further.
The deployment areas for Zapad 2017 will include several training sites that have been prominently used for ground artillery. This fact alone is nothing exciting or noteworthy for the Russian military, which is known for its obsession with artillery. However, in 2017, the Russian military will have a chance to show off its newest self-propelled howitzer, the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV. Many defense analysts have been incredulous of Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) specifications for the system, such as a claimed rate of fire of 16 rounds per minute (likely closer to 8 rpm) and a 30-40km effective range. With the invitation of NATO observers, the West may have the chance to give an honest assessment of Russia’s boasts. Analysts should be especially keen to discern the performance of the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV’s GLONASS-guided shells, which were part of Russia’s effort to match Western technological advantages in the same arena.
What will likely not be in Zapad 2017 is the prolifically covered T-14 Armata Tank, which was first revealed in a 2015 military parade. Most estimates for the T-14 do not have it ready for operational testing until 2019, making it unlikely that it and its innovative protection features, such as its Afghanit active protection system (APS), will make even a limited appearance.
Russia brings more than new equipment to Zapad exercises, which are often used to signal new operational concepts to the world. In 2013 the small unit tactics utilized in the Crimean invasion were a major highlight. Official information on what will occur in Zapad 2017 is, naturally, scarce. Thankfully, there are smaller exercises analysts can glean information from for Zapad 2017, primarily the Belarus-hosted trilateral military exercise, “Slavic Brotherhood 2017.” A RedStar article summarizing “Slavic Brotherhood” highlights that military forces conducted operations in highly complex terrain including swamps, woods, and rivers. The difficulty of operating in complex terrains was compounded by an emphasis on night operations. The exercise also focused on electronic warfare operations.
According to the Atlantic Council’s DFRLAbs, the staging grounds for Zapad 2017 are well suited for carrying out many different types of military operations such as artillery strikes, air defense, air strikes, etc. And articles about “Slavic Brotherhood 2017” have also noted that there was an emphasis on small unit combined arms tactics. However, this information may be misinformation and does not necessarily indicate widespread integrated operations (different from joint operations) will be carried out in Zapad 2017. The complexity of carrying out integrated operations calls for a level of training that Russia may not be able to afford this year. The Russian military did see a 25 percent reduction in its budget, the largest since the 1990s. The level and complexity of operations carried out in Zapad 2017 will be a telling sign of whether Russia is still struggling to carry out integrated operations on par with those in the West.
An emphasis on small-unit combined tactics and electronic warfare would fit nicely with the idea that Russia is continuing to hone its hybrid warfare concepts. But reports on the logistics for the exercise, including several thousand rail cars for equipment, does not suggest that “small-unit” will be of emphasis. This remains to be seen, of course, and the West should watch closely to discern if Russia’s focus is weighted towards preparing troops for hybrid operations or state-on-state conflicts.
The West should not let the hysteria that surrounds the Zapad 2017 exercise overshadow a real opportunity to better understand Russia along with its emerging capabilities and concepts. A tangible deterrent, no matter the size, now exists in the region, unlike in 2008 and 2013. The West should carefully watch what Russia brings to the table and how it utilizes that equipment in Zapad 2017 so that if and when a real threat emerges, it will be ready.
Daniel Urchick is the Eurasia & Eastern Europe Fellow at Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YPFP). He is also a compliance contractor at the Department of Defense. Daniel earned his MA in Political Science from Central Michigan University in 2015 and expects to receive his MA in Security Policy Studies from George Washington University in 2018.
